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Withholding Treatment from Defective Infants:
"Infant Doe" Postmortem
On April 9, 1982, a Down's syndrome infant, known only as "In-
fant Doe," was born in a Bloomington, Indiana hospital.1 The infant
needed surgery to correct a blocked esophagus and thereby allow
food to reach its stomach. The parents, as advised by attending phy-
sicians, decided to withhold the necessary surgery and also food and
water, from the child.2 Six days later the infant died.3 National me-
dia attention touched off a storm of controversy over whether the
parents' decision was justified.4 The widespread public debate even-
tually caused the Department of Health and Human Services to issue
regulations designed to prevent withholding treatment from defec-
tive infants.5
The recent public attention prompted by the "Infant Doe" case
was preceded by a prolonged debate in both the legal6 and medical 7
1 In re Infant Doe, No. 608204-004A at 1 (Monroe County Cir., Apr. 12, 1982) (declara-
tory judgment), cert. denied, 52 U.S.L.W. 3369 (U.S. Nov. 8, 1983) (No. 83-437).
2 Id at 2-3.
3 Baby's Death Brings End to Court Battle, The Evansville Courier, Apr. 16, 1982, at 1, col.
3.
4 See, e.g., Tifft, Debate on the Boundary of Life, TIME, April 11, 1983 at 68, col. 1; Trafford,
Doctor's Dilemma; Treat or Let Die?, U.S. NEws &WORLD REP., December 6, 1982 at 58, col. 1;
Infant Doe: Where to Draw the Lie, Washington Post, July 27, 1982, at A- 15, col. 1; Was Indiana
Couple Entitled to Allow Their Baby to Die?, Chicago Tribune, May 22, 1982, at 6, col. 1; From
Abortion to Infanticide, Chicago Tribune, April 22, 1982, §1, at 24, col. 3; The Killing Will Not
Stop, Washington Post, April 22, 1982, at A12, col. 2.
5 See notes 106-116 infia and accompanying text.
6 See, e.g., Clarke, The Choice to Refuse or Withhold Medical Treatment: The Emerging Techno-
logical and Medical Ethical Consensus, 13 CREIGHTON L. REv. 795 (1980); Ellis, Letting Defective
Babies Die, Who Decides?, 7 AM. J.L. & MED. 393 (1982); Horan, Euthanasia: Medical Treatment
and the Mongoloid Child, Death or a Treatment of Choice? 27 BAYLOR L. REV. 76 (1975); Kelsey,
Which Infants Should Live, Who Should Decide?, 5 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 5 (Apr. 1975);
Longino, Withholding Treatment From Defective Newborns: Who Decides, and on What Criteria?, 31
U. KAN. L. REv. 377 (1983); Robertson, Involuntary Euthanasia of Defective Newborns: A Legal
Anaysis, 21 STAN. L. REV. 213 (1974); Shaw, Genetically Defective Children: Emerging Legal Con-
siderations, 3 AM. J.L. & MED. 333 (1977); Note, Birth Defective Infants: A Standard for Non-
Treatment Decisions, 30 STAN. L. REV. 599 (1975); Note, Euthanasia: Criminal, Tort, Constitutional
and Legislative Considerations, 48 NOTRE DAME LAW. 1202 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Note,
Euthanasia]; Comment, Withholding Treatment From Defective Newborns: SubstitutedJudgment, In-
formed Comment and the Quinlan Decision, 13 GONZ. L. REV. 781 (1978).
7 See, e.g., Black, Selective Treatment of Infants with Myelomeningocele, 5 NEUROSURGERY 334
(1979); Campbell & Duff, Moral and Ethical Dilemma in the Special Care Nursery, 289 NEw ENG.
J. MED. 890 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Campbell & Duff, Special Care Nursery]; Campbell &
Duff, Moral and Ethical Dilemma: Seven Years into the Debate About Human Ambiguity, 447 ANNALS
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professions concerning withholding treatment from defective in-
fants.8 The debate has concerned two categories of infants. The first
category includes infant's with severe physical defects, such as spina
bifida with myelomeningocele.9 Even when treated, these infants
will have a permanent physical handicap or paralysis, and sometimes
mental retardation. The second category includes infants with a sur-
gically correctable physical defect,' 0 and an underlying permanent
mental handicap such as Down's syndrome."I Although these in-
fants' physical defects can be corrected, their mental handicaps can-
not. The long term physical or mental handicaps of infants in both
categories are seen by some individuals as a justification for with-
holding treatment, and even food and water, from the infants,
thereby "allowing" them to die.
In 1973, two physicians revealed that during an eighteen month
period at the Yale-New Haven Hospital special care nursery, 14% of
the 299 infant deaths were related to withholding treatment. 12 In the
19 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Campbell & Duff, Seven Years]; Diamond, The Deformed Child's
Right to Life, in DEATH, DYING AND EUTHANASIA 127 (D. Horan & D. Mall eds. 1977); John-
son, Selective Non- Treatment and Spina Bi da: A Case Study in Ethical Theog and Application, 3
BIOETHICS Q. 91 (1981); Koop, Ethical and Surgical Considerations in the Care of the Newborn with
Congenital Abnormalities, in INFANTICIDE AND THE HANDICAPPED NEWBORN (M. Delahoyd &
D. Horan eds. 1982); Lorber, Spina Bifid" To Treat or Not To Treat? Selection-The Best Poliq
Available, 147 NURSING MIRROR 14 (1978); McCormick, To Save or Let Die: The Dilemma of
Modern Medicine, 339 J. A.M.A. 172 (1974); Shaw,Dilemma of'Informed Consent"in Children, 289
NEW ENG. J. MED. 885 (1973); Silverman, Mismatched Attitudes about Neonatal Death, 11 HAS-
TINGS CENTER REP. 12 (Dec. 1981).
8 Other professions have also joined the debate. See, e.g., Boyle, Treating Defective
Newborns; Who Decides? On What Basis?, 63 Hosp. PROG. 34 (Aug. 1982) (philosopher); Bridge
& Bridge, The Brief Lifo and Death of Christopher Bridge, 11 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 17 (Dec.
1981) (parents of defective infant); McCarthy, Treating Defective Newborns: Who Judges Ex-
traordina Means?, 62 Hosp. PRoO. 45 (Dec. 1981) (clergy).
9 Spina Bifida with myelomeningocele is an open defect in the spine and associated
structures, and occurs in up to 4 infants per 1,000 births. W. NELSON, TEXTBOOK OF PEDI-
ATRICS 1413 (R. McKay & V. Vaughan 10th ed. 1975). The condition causes various degrees
of permanent paralysis and deformity. Mental retardation accompanies this condition in fifty
percent of the cases and hydrocephalus (a gross enlargement of the cranium caused by ac-
cumulation of fluid in the brain) develops in ninety percent of the cases. Id.
10 One example of a surgically correctible defect is tracheo-esophogeal fistula, a condi-
tion which blocks the passage from the mouth to the stomach and therefore prevents oral
feeding. See note 71 infia and accompanying text.
11 Down's syndrome, also known as mongolism or trisomy 21 syndrome, occurs in ap-
proximately 1.5 infants per 1,000 births and is accompanied by varying degrees of retardation
and personality disorders. NELSON, supra note 9, at 134-37. As a result of recent improve-
ments in the education and training of people with Down's syndrome, many of those afflicted
with the condition are now able to live fairly normal, productive lives. For a concise state-
ment of other various defects, see Ellis, Letting Defective Babies Die, Who Decides?, 7 AM. J.L. &
MED. 393, 394-98 (1982).
12 Campbell & Duff, Special Care Nursery, supra note 7, at 890.
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following years, various commentators discussed the civil, criminal,
and constitutional issues involved in a non-treatment decision. These
discussions considered the questions of who should decide when a
defective infant should die and on what criteria the decision should
be based.1 3 Crucial to these questions are the rights and interests of
the parties involved: the infant, the parents, the physician, and soci-
ety in general. 14 Various approaches to legislation have been sug-
gested, 15 each focusing on how best to safeguard the often competing
rights and interests of the parties involved. Unfortunately, the
Health and Human Services Regulations prompted by the "Infant
Doe" case were hastily considered and promulgated, and are ill-
suited for dealing with such a complex problem.' 6 Several states
have also recently enacted legislation concerning withholding treat-
ment from defective infants.' 7 Although these statutes comprise a
more considered, thoughtful treatment of the problem, their provi-
sions fall short of an ideal solution.
This note begins in Part I by briefly reviewing the rights and
interests involved in withholding treatment from defective infants,
and illustrates, through several recent cases, the judicial inconsis-
tency in dealing with this issue. Next, Part II examines the Health
and Human Services regulations, the public and medical commu-
nity's reaction to them, and the recent challenge of these regulations
in court. Part III discusses the recent state statutes dealing with this
issue and their shortcomings, and then proposes a suggested ap-
proach for future legislation.
I. Competing Rights and Interests: Whose Interests Prevail?
In the past, because the practice of withholding treatment from
defective infants occurred in the privacy of hospitals, it received little
or no publicity.' Due to recent increased public attention, however,
more of these cases are now reaching the courts. When confronted
with a case in which treatment has been withheld, the courts must
balance the often competing rights and interests involved. The deci-
sions in these cases have been inconsistent, with some courts granting
priority to parental rights of privacy and some granting priority to
the defective infant's right to life.
13 See notes 6 and 7 supra.
14 See notes 19-38 infra and accompanying text.
15 See notes 141-164 infra and accompanying text.
16 See notes 106-116 infra and accompanying text.
17 See notes 161-194 infra and accompanying text.
18 Robertson, supra note 6, at 241-42.
[19831
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The rights and interests of a defective infant are difficult to eval-
uate. All individuals have a basic right to life, 19 and defective new-
born infants are no different. Infants also have an interest, however,
in a life unhampered by physical defects, infirmities, and suffering.20
Some commentators believe that courts must focus primarily on the
infant's right to life and that other competing interests are inconse-
quential.2 ' However, other commentators believe that a defective in-
fant also has a right to die, analagous to that of a competent adult
who decides to have life-sustaining treatment withheld.2 2 In evaluat-
ing an incompetent adult's wish to die, however, the court must sub-
stitute for the incompetent's judgment that of a person qualified to
evaluate his wishes, such as an immediate family member.2 3 In the
context of a newborn infant, the question of substituted judgment is
even more complex. A defective infant's parents may not be able to
fairly assess the infant's wishes due to their own competing interests.
Parents' rights and interests are intimately involved in a decision
concerning the medical treatment of their infant. Traditionally, par-
ents have been afforded broad authority to make decisions concern-
ing the welfare of their children.2 4 The parents' lives will be deeply
affected by any decision concerning treatment of their defective in-
fant. However, parental rights can be terminated when their actions
become detrimental to the health or well-being of the child.2 5 When
confronted with a decision regarding their defective newborn, par-
ents will probably consider factors other than the best interests of the
defective infant.2 6 For example, since the costs of caring for a defec-
19 The fifth, ninth, and fourteenth amendments guarantee a person's right to life. The
fifth amendment states: "No person shall ... be deprived of life ... without due process of
law ... ." U.S. CONST. amend. V. The fourteenth amendment requires the same guaran-
tees to be provided by states. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The right to life might other-
wise be guaranteed by the ninth amendment: "The enumeration in the Constitution, of
certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people."
U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
20 Longino, supra note 6, at 383. State child neglect laws generally protect infants' inter-
ests; they allow juvenile courts to intervene and take custody of a child who is in danger of
physical abuse or injury. Paulsen, The LegalFrameworkfor Child Protection, 66 COLUM. L. REV.
679, 693-97 (1956).
21 See generallv, Diamond, supra note 7, at 136-137; Koop, supra note 7, at 55.
22 See, e.g., Garland, Care of the Newborn." The.Decision not to Treat, 1 PERINATOL-
OGY/NEONATOLOGY 14, 16 (Sept.-Oct., 1977); Silverman, supra note 7, at 15-16.
23 See In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976).
24 The Supreme Court has recognized this right many times. See note 30 infra.
25 See, e.g.,In re Phillip B., 92 Cal. App. 3d 796, 801, 156 Cal. Rptr. 48, 51 (1979).
26 The considerations at such a time can be rather oppressive:
[I]f the child is treated and accepted at home, difficult and demanding adjustments
must be made. Parents must learn how to care for a disabled child, confront
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tive infant can be staggering, the family's financial situation could be
a significant factor.2 7 Also, the infant's presence may adversely affect
the stability of the parents' marriage and the emotional well-being of
siblings.28 If such considerations persuade the parents of a defective
infant to withhold treatment from the infant, the parents' right to
make such a decision should then be balanced against the defective
infant's rights. Since the constitution does not explicitly mention a
parental right of privacy, 29 the constitutional bases and limitations of
this right are rather unclear and provide no firm guidance for the
courts.
30
financial and psychological uncertainty, meet the needs of other siblings, and work
through their own conflicting feelings. Mothering demands are greater than with a
normal child, particularly if medical care and hospitalization are frequently re-
quired. Counseling or professional support may be nonexistent or difficult to ob-
tain. Younger siblings may react with hostility and guilt, or with shame and anger.
Often the normal feedback of child growth that renders the turmoil of childbearing
worthwhile develops more slowly or not at all. Family resources can be depleted
(especially if medical care is needed), consumption patterns altered, or standards of
living modified. Housing may have to be found closer to a hospital, and plans for
further children changed. Finally, the anxieties, guilt, and grief present at birth
may threaten to recur or become chronic.
Robertson, supra note 6, at 257-58. See also Fost, Counseling Families Who Have a Child With a
Severe Congenital Anomaly, 67 PEDIAT. 321, 322-23 (1981); Gustafson, Mongolism, Parental Desires,
and the Rzght to Li, in DEATH, DYING AND EUTHANASIA 254-59 (D. Horan & D. Mall eds.
1977).
27 For example, in one 1976 case, six months of treatment for a premature baby cost
$104,403.20. Stinson & Stinson, On the Death ofa Baby, 7J. MED. ETHICs 5, 10 (1981). See also
Lorber, supra note 7, at 16 ("By the time a child with spina bifida has left school he will have
cost some 100,000 [pounds sterling]-much more than the lifetime earnings of an average
family-and yet the results are often disastrous.").
28 See, e.g., Robertson, note 26 supra; How Two Couples Dealt With Doomed Children, Chi-
cago Tribune, Feb. 24, 1980, at 17, col. 3.
29 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1972).
30 The Supreme Court has gradually developed the "right" of parental autonomy and
privacy in various situations. The earliest cases involved education; the Court first based a
parent's right to direct their child's education upon the concept of liberty in the fourteenth
amendment which denotes freedom to "establish a home and bring up children .... "
Mayer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1922). The Court, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510, 534 (1924), reaffirmed the fourteenth amendment rights of "parents and guardians
to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control."
A broader recognition of parental autonomy came in Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S.
158 (1943), where despite a finding that the state could regulate children engaged in street
preaching, the Court said:
It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in
the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obliga-
tions the state can neither supply nor hinder [citing Pierce] and it is in recognition of
this that these decisions have respected the private realm of family life which the
state cannot enter.
Id at 166.
The right of parental privacy is also linked to the rights of marital privacy and some
[1983]
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Another concern of a defective infant's parents may be their pos-
sible criminal liability. Although no parents have ever been tried for
withholding treatment or food and water from the infant, commen-
tators generally agree that parents who do so would be subject to
criminal charges of murder, attempted murder, or conspiracy to
murder.
31
The state also has several competing interests in defective infant
cases. The state is first concerned with upholding the value of life, a
basic, integral concept in society's moral structure. 32 The common
law concept ofparenspariae33 vests the state with guardianship power
aspects of procreation. In Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1941), the Court struck
down a state law providing for the sterilization of criminals because the law interfered with
the basic right of marriage and procreation. The Court further enunciated this concept in
Griswald v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1954), while holding that a Connecticut law forbid-
ding the use of contraceptives violated the right of marital privacy. The Court found the
right of marital privacy existed within the "penumbra" of the first amendment rights:
[Sjpecific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations
from those guarantees that help give them life and substance. Various guarantees
create zones of privacy ....
We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights-older than our polit-
ical parties, older than our school system. Marriage is a coming together for better
or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred.
Id at 484-86 (citation omitted). In Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1971), the Court, in
striking down a Massachusetts statute forbidding the sale of contraceptives to unmarried peo-
ple, seemed to somewhat diminish the marital privacy right established in Griswald. The
Court said that marriage is basically an association of two individuals and that the right of
privacy which protects personal decisions on procreation is an individual right. Id at 453.
In Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213-15 (1972), the Court affirmed parents' rights to
direct their children's religious training. Then in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1972),
the Court reaffirmed that the concepts of personal privacy are founded upon various guaran-
tees in the first, fourth, fifth, ninth, and fourteenth amendments and applied the right of
privacy to family relationships (citing Prince), child rearing, and education (citing Pierce).
Most recently, in United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139 (1972), the Court stated: "The Consti-
tution extends special safeguards to the privacy of the home, just as it protects other special
privacy rights such as those of marriage, procreation, motherhood, child rearing, and educa-
tion." Id at 142.
Since the constitutional foundation of parental privacy is so vague, its limitations are
correspondingly indistinct. However, such an ill-defined right should probably yield to a
defective infant's fundamental right to life.
31 See Fost & Robertson, Passive Euthanasia of Dfective Newborn Infants: Legal Considerations,
88 J. PEDIAT. 883, 884 (1976); Robertson, supra note 6, at 217-18.
32 The value of life is such a fundamental concept in our society that "the common law
regards life as sacred and inalienable, and the criminal law reflects this basic philosophy."
Note, Euthanasia, supra note 6, at 1203-04 (citing State v. Moore, 25 Iowa 128, 135-136
(1868)).
33 Parens patriae is based upon English common law and was recognized in the United
States as early as 1846 when the Indiana Supreme Court defined it as "the duty of looking
after the welfare of those who, from tender age and imbecility of mind, are incapable of
taking care of themselves, [and] contains a principle necessary to the well being of any state,
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over disabled people and children, giving it the right to intervene to
preserve the physical or mental well-being of these individuals.
3 4
Child abuse laws also provide the state with the authority to inter-
vene where a child's well-being is endangered. 35 Unfortunately, the
state must also consider a practical problem-the allocation of scarce
medical resources, which some commentators believe should not be
squandered on hopeless cases.
3 6
Physicians and hospitals, like the state, also have an interest in
determining how medical resources are allocated. However, aside
from concern for the patient's welfare, they must also consider the
possibility that a decision to withhold treatment may subject them to
civil or criminal liability.3 7 Several commentators have concluded
that a decision to withhold treatment would subject doctors, as well
as the parents, to criminal charges.
38
whatever may be the form of its government." McCord v. Ochiltree, 8 Blackf. 15, 19-20 (Ind.
1846).
34 Parham v. J.W., 442 U.S. 584, 603 (1978). The state's parens patriae power has fre-
quently been invoked to limit parental authority over children. In Prince v. Massachusetts,
321 U.S. 158, 166 (1943), the Supreme Court stated:
Acting to guard the general interest in youth's well being, the state asparenspatriae
may restrict the parent's control by requiring school attendance, regulating or
prohibiting the child's labor and in many other ways. . . . The right to practice
religion freely does not include liberty to exploit . . . the child . . . to ill health or
death. The catalogue need not be lengthened. . . . The state has a wide range of
power for limiting parental fleedom and authority in things aecting the child's welfare.
Id. at 166-67 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
35 See Paulsen, The Legal Framework For Child Protection, 66 COLUM. L. REv. 679, 693-703
(1966). For further discussion of state intervention on behalf of neglected children, see Bas-
kin, State Intrusion into Famil Affairs." Justfiations and Limitations, 26 STAN. L. REv. 1383
(1974); Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of Neglected Children. A Search for Realistic Standards, 27
STAN. L. REV. 985 (1975).
36 See, e.g., Longino, supra note 6, at 393; Health-Care Rationing Consensus Backed, Phoenix
Gazette, June 4, 1983, at A3, col. 1.
37 Several commentators have discussed the possible liabilities of physicians and hospitals
for withholding treatment from defective infants. See, e.g., Chabon, You May Face a Nightmare
in the Newborn Nursery, 7 LEGAL Asp. MED. PRAC. 43, 45 (1979); Fost & Robertson, supra note
31, at 884-86; Robertson, supra note 6, at 224-44; Note, Euthanasia, supra note 6, at 1203-26
(1973).
38 See the sources cited in note 37 supra. In the United States, although physicians have
had criminal charges brought against them, none have gone to trial. See notes 55-58 infia and
accompanying text.
In England, however, at least one doctor has been tried for withholding treatment from a
defective infant. In this case a jury found a doctor who had withheld treatment and food
from a Down's syndrome infant not guilty of attempted murder, even though the child died
within three days. Brahams, Acquittal of Paediatrician Charged After Death of Infant With Down's
Syndrome, 2 LANCET 1101, 1101 (Nov. 14, 1981). However, one comentator pointed out that
the physician's acquittal was merely based on the facts of the case and did not resolve the
legal issues involved. Dr. Leonard Arthur: His Trial and its Implications, 283 BRIT. MED. J. 1340,
[1983]
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Courts have dealt differently with the various competing rights
and interests involved in a decision not to treat a defective infant. In
Matter of Cicero,39 the parents of a newborn infant girl with spina
bifida with myelomeningocele 4° refused to consent to surgery to re-
pair the infant's condition.41 Untreated, this condition will cause
death or extensive paralysis and mental retardation; surgical treat-
ment can in many cases lessen the degree of paralysis and even pre-
vent mental retardation.42 The New York court awarded custody to
a guardian for consent for the treatment. 43 The court found that in
this case, where the infant had a "reasonable opportunity to live, to
grow and to surmount [her] handicaps," her interests superseded pa-
rental rights to withhold treatment.44 The court stated: "Parental
rights. . . are not absolute. Children are not property whose dispo-
sition is left to parental discretion without hindrance." 45 The court
also rejected any philosophy that would allow newborn infants to die
without an effort to save their lives.46 The court relied on its parens
patriae power and the New York child neglect statutes as authority to
order treatment.47 There is no record of criminal charges against the
parents or physicians involved in this case.
An Illinois case, In reJef and Scott Mueller,48 involved Siamese
twins born joined at the waist.49 The parents and attending physi-
cians decided not to surgically separate the children, and further, not
1340 (1981). Of particular significance was a defense expert's testimony that his autopsy of
the infant revealed physical defects undiscovered by the prosecution's expert. Brahams,supra,
at 1101. This evidence suggested that the child may have possibly died from these other
defects, not dehydration or starvation. Id
39 101 Misc. 2d 699, 421 N.Y.S.2d 965 (Bronx County Sup. Ct. 1979).
40 For an explanation of this condition, see note 9 supra.
41 101 Misc. 2d at 700, 421 N.Y.S.2d at 966.
42 Lorber, supra note 7, at 16.
43 101 Misc. 2d at 702-03, 421 N.Y.S.2d at 968.
44 Id at 701, 421 N.Y.S.2d at 968.
45 Id at 702, 421 N.Y.S.2d at 968.
46 The court stated:
There is a hint in this proceeding of a philosophy that newborn, "'hopeless" lives
should be permitted to expire without an effort to save those lives. Fortunately, the
medical evidence here is such that we do not confront a hopeless life. . . . [Tlhere
is a strident cry in America to terminate the lives of other people-deemed physi-
cally and mentally defective. This court was not constituted to hear that cry.
Rather . . it is our function to secure each his opportunity for "life, liberty, and
the pursuit of happiness."
Id. at 702, 421 NY.S.2d at 968 (quoting Matter of Weberlist, 79 Misc. 2d 753, 757, 360
N.Y.S.2d 783, 787 (N.Y. County Sup. Ct. 1972)).
47 101 Misc. 2d at 701, 421 N.Y.S.2d at 967.
48 Nos. 81J300 & 81J301 (Ill. 5th Cir., May 15, 1981) (order granting custody).
49 Robertson, Dilemma in Danville, 11 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 5, 5 (Oct. 198 1).
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to feed the children. 50 When informed of the situation, the Illinois
Department of Children and Family Services (IDCFS) filed a neglect
petition with the Illinois Family Court to gain custody of the twins.
The court subsequently awarded custody to IDCFS for the purpose
of authorizing surgery and medical treatment for the twins.5 1 While
the Cicero court did not specifically mention the right to life, the Muel-
ler court found the twins' "inalienable right to life," granted by the
Illinois State Constitution, could not be disregarded by any "individ-
ual, professional group, legal, medical, or otherwise .... "52 In its
decision, the court did not discuss how the twins' right to life bal-
anced against competing parental privacy rights.
The Mueller court, like the Cicero court, also relied on child ne-
glect laws for its authority to order treatment for the twins. The
court found that, under the Illinois child neglect laws, the twins were
entitled to both an expert examination and an attempt to correct
their problem, neither of which had been done. 53 The court held
that the failure to provide such examination and treatment consti-
tuted neglect, but declined to fix blame upon the parents or the at-
tending physicians, implying that the neglect was unintentional.
54
On June 11, 1981, in an unprecedented move, the Illinois State's
Attorney in Danville filed charges of attempted murder against the
Mueller twin's parents and the attending physician. 55 At the pre-
liminary hearing, however, nurses did not link the parents or physi-
cian with the order to withhold food, and the charges were
dismissed. 56 The State's Attorney subsequently asked a grand jury to
indict the twin's parents on charges of attempted murder, conspiracy
to murder, and solicitation to murder. He also attempted to indict
the attending physician on conspiracy to murder.57 The grand jury
did not indict. 58
50 "Do not feed in accordance with parent's wishes" was written on the medical chart.
id
51 Mueller, order at 3-4.
52 Id at 1. The Illinois Constitution states in part: "All men.., have certain inaliena-
ble rights among which are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness." ILL. CONST. art. I, §1.
53 In re Jeff and Scott Mueller, No. 81J300 & 81J301 at 1 (Ill. 5th Cir., May 15, 1981)
(findings of fact accompanying order).
54 Id. at 1. Since the court found that "all parties involved thought they were doing the
right thing," it simply found "the minors were not given proper and necessary treatment...
[and] they were substantially denied food" and made no finding in regard to parental neglect.
Id at 3. See also, The Moral Dilemma of Siamese Twins, NEWSWEEK, June 22, 1981, at 40, col. 1.
55 Robertson, supra note 49, at 5.
56 Id.




In Re Philh'h B. ,59 a California case, did not involve withholding
treatment from a defective infant, but the issues involved in the case
were quite similar to those in defective infant cases. Phillip, a twelve
year-old Down's syndrome child, suffered from a congenital heart de-
fect which, if untreated, would cause a gradual deterioration of the
lungs and eventual death.60 When Phillip's parents refused to con-
sent to the surgery necessary to repair the defect, the California juve-
nile probation department filed a petition in juvenile court
requesting that Phillip be declared a ward of the court for the pur-
pose of permitting the surgery. 61 The juvenile court dismissed the
petition because the juvenile probation department had failed to
show by clear and convincing evidence that the child had not been
provided the "necessities of life."
'62
On appeal, the California Court of Appeals for the First District
upheld the juvenile court's ruling.63 The court reviewed the constitu-
tional foundation and development of parental privacy as an out-
growth of fourteenth amendment privacy rights. 64 The court stated
that parental rights are not absolute, and that "[o]ne of the most
basic values protected by the state is the sanctity of human life."
'65
The court commented that when parents deny their children ade-
quate medical care, the state has a right and a duty to intervene
under theparenspatriae doctrine, to protect the children.66 The court
warned, however, that the state must overcome a "serious burden of
justification" before abridging the parental autonomy presump-
tion.67 It concluded that the trial court had faithfully balanced the
risks and benefits involved in the operation and that it could not say
that "as a matter of law" there was no substantial evidence to sup-
port the trial court's decision.68
59 92 Cal. App. 3d 796, 156 Cal. Rptr. 48 (1979), cer. denied, 445 U.S. 949 (1980).
60 The defect-a ventricular septal defect-causes elevated pulmonary blood pressure,
and increases the rate at which the heart must pump blood. Id at 800, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 50.
61 At the hearing doctors testified that the surgery involved a five to ten percent mortal-
ity rate for normal patients, but posed higher risk to patients with Down's syndrome. This
higher mortality rate is due to greater risk of post-operative complications in Down's syn-
drome children. Id, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 50-51. The doctors also testified that surgical correc-
tion of the defect would significantly lengthen Phillip's then expected twenty-year life span.
Ia', 156 Cal. Rptr. at 50-51.
62 Id at 802, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 51-52.
63 Id at 804, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 52.
64 Id at 801, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 50-51.
65 Id, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 51 (citing U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1).
66 Id, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 51.
67 Id at 802, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 51.
68 Id at 803, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 51. In In Re Becker, 7 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 2647, 2648
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Probably more than any other case, the "Infant Doe" 69 or
"Bloomington Baby" case has roused the greatest public reaction.
Infant Doe was born on April 9, 1982, in a Bloomington, Indiana
hospital. 70 Shortly thereafter, the attending physician diagnosed the
child as suffering from Down's syndrome and tracheo-esophageal
fistula, a condition which blocks the esophogeal passage from the
mouth to the stomach, therefore preventing oral feeding. 7' After the
parents decided to withhold treatment, food, and water from the in-
fant, a hospital representative contacted a Monroe County Superior
Court judge.
72
After a short hearing at the hospital,73 the court ordered the hos-
pital to comply with the parent's non-treatment decision.74 Three
days later, on April 13, the Monroe County prosecutor filed a peti-
tion with the Monroe County Juvenile Court for an emergency de-
tention order to have custody of the child taken from the parents.
75
The juvenile referee pro tern decided there was no probable cause to
suspect parental neglect and denied the petition. 76 On April 14th,
(Aug. 7, 1981) the California Superior Court for Santa Clara County awarded custody of
Phillip to a couple and authorized "immediate catheterization to determine the feasibility of
surgery for his ventral septal defect."
69 In re Infant Doe, No. GU8204-004A (Monroe County Cir., Apr. 12, 1982) (declaratory
judgment), cert. denied, 52 U.S.L.W. 3369 (U.S. Nov. 8, 1983) (No. 83-437) [hereinafter cited as
Infant Doe].
70 Id. at 1.
71 W. NELSON, TEXTBOOK OF PEDIATRICS 803-04 (R. McKay and V. Vaughan 10th ed.
1975). This condition can be corrected in most patients; 78% of patients without other anom-
alies survive corrective treatment. Id at 805. The attending physician consulted several
doctors who agreed with the diagnosis. Infant Doe, at 1.
72 Rebone, "Ainimal Quality of Life' . Why Parents, Courts Chose Infant Doe's Death, 63 Hosp.
PROG. 10, 10 (June 1982).
73 On April 10, the court held a hearing at the hospital. Infant Doe, at 1. Infant Doe's
father, the parents' attorney, various hospital officials, and six doctors attended the hearing.
Id. The delivering obstetrician testified that the possibility that the infant would have a
minimally adequate quality of life was non-existent due to his "severe and irreversable mental
retardation." Id at 2. He recommended treatment consisting of only sedation to keep the
infant free of pain. Id A consulting pediatrician recommended the infant be transferred to a
hospital in Indianapolis for immediate surgery. Two other pediatricians agreed with this
latter recommendation. Id.
The infant's father testified that he and his wife felt a minimally acceptable quality of
life was never present for a Down's syndrome child. Id at 3. He also testified that he and his
wife had signed a statement directing that medical treatment, food, and water be withheld in
accordance with the delivering obstetrician's recommendation. Id
74 Id. The court also appointed the Monroe County Department of Public Welfare as
infant Doe's guardian for purposes of appeal. Id at 4.
75 Rebone, supra note 72, at 10.
76 The referee found that since the parents had made their decision after consulting phy-
sicians, and had chosen one of two medical options presented them, there was no probable
cause for neglect. Id.
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the Monroe County prosecutor unsuccessfully appealed both rulings
to the Indiana Supreme Court. 77 On the afternoon of April 15th, the
Monroe County Superior Court denied a married couple's petition to
intervene to adopt the child.
78
Infant Doe died on the evening of April 15, 1982, while a county
prosecutor and an Indiana University law professor were en route to
Washington for an emergency appeal to United States Supreme
Court Justice John Paul Stevens. 79 The coroner's report listed multi-
ple congenital abnormalities as the proximate cause of death and de-
hydration and lack of food as contributing factors.
80
When the Infant Doe court's rationale is compared to the ration-
ale of previous decisions, many inconsistencies appear. Unlike the
New York court in Cicero,", the Monroe County court felt that the
value of parental autonomy outweighed the infant's right to life
where "a minimally adequate quality of life was non-existent.
'8 2
And unlike the California Appeals Court in Philip B. ,83 the Monroe
County court said the fourteenth amendment had been "often mis-
quoted to stand for the right of life" but that its actual purpose is to
safeguard the family's right to be free from undue governmental in-
terference. 84 The Indiana Constitution, like the Illinois Constitu-
tion,8 5 guarantees an "inalienable" right to life.8 6 The Infant Doe
court apparently did not consider this guarantee relevant in it's deci-
sion to allow withholding treatment, food, and water from Infant
Doe. 87 In contrast, the Mueller court found the Illinois guarantee
77 The court denied the prosecutor's mandamus petitions. Id at 11. See also, Supreme Court
Refiuses to Order Care for Dying Baby, The Evansville Journal-Gazette, Apr. 15, 1982. On April
15, the Monroe County Juvenile Court denied both an injunction to force Bloomington Hos-
pital officials to keep the baby alive, and a temporary restraining order to require the infant's
parents to provide nutrition and medical care. Rebone, supra note 72, at 13. The Monroe
County Superior Court also denied an appeal for a restraining order. Id
78 Id at 14. Several other families also volunteered to adopt the infant. Id
79 Id
80 Id
81 See notes 44-45 supra and accompanying text.
82 Letter from Judge John Baker of the Monroe County Superior Court to anonymous
person at 2 (June 8, 1983) (discussing rationale of the Infant Doe decision)[hereinafter Letter].
All records other than Judge Baker's original order and his letter have been sealed. Tele-
phone conversation with S. Deckard, Assistant Court Reporter, Monroe County Superior
Court (Mar. 25, 1983).
83 See note 65 supra and accompanying text.
84 Letter, supra note 82, at 3.
85 See note 52 supra.
86 IND. CONST. art. I, § 1.
87 The court did not mention the guarantee in its order or letter to an anonymous person.
See Letter, supra note 82.
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highly relevant in its decision to order treatment of the Mueller
twins.88 Also, unlike the Cicero and Mueller courts, the Infant Doe
court found that withholding treatment, food, and water from the
infant did not constitute neglect under the state child neglect statutes
since the court "could not [say] the parents were not acting in the
best interests of the child. . .. "9 The Monroe County prosecutor
did not file criminal charges against either the infant's parents or the
attending physician.90
Most recently, on October 28, 1983, the New York Court of Ap-
peals affirmed the dismissal of a legal guardian's application for cor-
rective surgery for a newborn defective infant.91 The infant,
identified only as "Baby Jane Doe," was born on October 11, 1983,
in a Long Island, N.Y. hospital. 92 The infant's defects included spina
bifida and accompanying hydrocephalus, 93 microcephaly, 94 and
other neurological defects.95 After consulting with doctors and coun-
selors, the parents decided against surgery to correct the infant's de-
fects and decided to follow a more "conservative" treatment. 96
Shortly thereafter, a Vermont resident unconnected with the family
filed a petition in the Suffolk County Supreme Court which resulted
in the court appointing a legal guardian for the infant.97 The guard-
ian petitioned the court to order surgery for the infant, and, after two
88 Aueller, order at 1.
89 Letter, supra note 82, at 3. The Indiana legislature recently revised their child neglect
laws to include in their definition of a neglected child:
[A] handicapped child who is deprived of nutrition that is necessary to sustain life,
or who is deprived of medical or surgical intervention that is necessary to remedy or
ameliorate a life threatening medical condition, if the nutrition or medical or surgi-
cal intervention is generally provided to similarly situated handicapped or non-
handicapped children.
Act of Apr. 19, 1983, Pub. L. No. 288-1983, 1983 Ind. Acts 1783 (to be codified at IND. CODE
§ 31-6-4-3).
90 Charges Weighed for Parents Who Let Baby Die Untreated, N.Y. Times, Apr. 17, 1983, at 6,
col. 1.
91 Weber v. Stony Brook Hospital, No. 83-672, slip op. at 5 (N.Y. Oct. 28, 1983) (per
curiam). See also 52 U.S.L.W. 2267 (Nov. 15, 1983).
92 Spinal Surgeiyfor L.Z Baby Is Ordered and Then Stayed, N.Y. Times, Oct. 21, 1983, at 10,
col. 1.
93 For an explanation of these conditions, see note 9 supra.
94 Microcephally is a defect in the growth of the head which causes progressive mental
retardation. NELSON, supra note 9, at 1417.
95 One doctor testified in a lower court hearing that these defects left the infant immobile
and incapable of controlling her body wastes. N.Y. Times, Oct. 21, 1983, at 10, col. 2.
96 Weber, slip op. at 1-2. The conservative treatment apparantly involved little more
than anti-biotics to prevent infection in the infant's spinal column defect. Di, Ifult Issues
Abound in Baby Jane Litigation, Nat'l. L.J., Nov. 7, 1983, at 6, col. 3.
97 Weber, slip op. at 2.
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days of hearings, the court did so.98 Within hours, an Appellate Divi-
sion Court stayed the order,99 and later dismissed the action, saying
the infant's parents had elected a treatment "well within accepted
medical standards."1
°
On appeal, the New York Court of Appeals affirmed the dismis-
sal, and like the Philh' B. court, based their decision on a procedural
issue. 01 The court noted that in Section 1032 of the New York Fam-
ily Court Act, 10 2 the legislature had assigned primary responsibility
for initiating child neglect actions in family court to child protective
agencies or persons acting at a family court's direction.103 The court
found that in this case, the petitioners had not observed this statutory
scheme. 104 To allow any person to thus bypass the statutory require-
ments, the court reasoned, would "catapult him into the very heart
of a family circle" to challenge the parents' responsibility to care for
their children.'0 5 The court observed that although there might be
appropriate occasions for court action without advice of a child pro-
tective agency, the court found such circumstances were not present
and that the proceding was therefore unjustified. 10 6
II. Administrative Regulation
The "Infant Doe" case prompted the Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS) to take two administrative actions. On May
18, 1982, the HHS director of the Office for Civil Rights issued a
"Notice to Health Care Providers." 0 7 This notice "reminded" hos-
pitals receiving federal financial aid that Section 504 of the Rehabili-
98 N.Y. Times, Oct. 21, 1983, at 10, col. 2. At the hearing, doctors testified that without
surgery, the child would die within six weeks, but that with successful surgery, the infant
could live to the age of twenty but would be retarded, epileptic, and bed ridden. Id
99 Id
100 Nat'l. LJ., Nov. 7, 1983 at 6, col. 4.
101 Weber, slip op. at 1.
102 N.Y. JUD. LAw § 1032 (McKinney Supp. 1976-1982).
103 Weber, slip op. at 3.
104 The court stated that neither the petitioner nor the Supreme Court had notified or
consulted with the state Department of Social Services before the hearing. Id at 4.
105 Id
106 Id at 4-5. Shortly after the Court of Appeals decision in Weber, the Justice Depart-
ment sued in Federal District Court to compel Stony Brook Hospital to produce the infant's
medical file. US Suingfor LI Records of Baby in Surgery Dispute, N.Y. Times, Nov. 3, 1983, at
19, col. 1. The Department wanted to determine whether the infant had been discriminated
against because of her handicaps. Id
107 Office for Civil Rights, Department of Health and Human Services, Discrimination
Against The Handicapped by Withholding Treatment or Nourishment; Notice of Health Care Providers, 47
FED. REG. 26027 (June 16, 1982) (notice issued May 18, 1982, applying 45 C.F.R. § 84 to
health services for handicapped children)[hereinafter cited as Notice].
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tation Act of 1973 108 applied to defective infants. 10 9 The notice
stated in part:
[I]t is unlawful . . . to withhold from a handicapped infant nutri-
tional sustenance or medical or surgical treatment required to cor-
rect a life threatening condition if:
(1) the withholding is based on the fact that the infant is handi-
capped; and
(2) the handicap does not render the treatment or nutritional suste-
nance medically contraindicated." 0
Although some commentators praised the notice,"' and physicians




On March 7, 1983, the HHS Secretary issued an "interim final
rule" to become effective on March 22, 1983. 14 The rule informed
hospitals that HHS intended to enforce the Section 504 require-
ments 15 with regard to handicapped infants. 1 6 The rule required
hospitals to post a notice in pediatric facilities stating that federal law
prohibited the failure to feed or care for handicapped infants.1 7 The
notice also provided a toll-free hotline number for use by "any per-
108 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976). Section 504 states in part:
No otherwise qualified handicapped individual . . . shall, solely by reason of his
handicap, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance .
Id.
109 Notice, supra note 107.
110 Id.
111 One commentator said the notice agreed with "accepted moral norms" and would
only serve to help handicapped infants "who should be the last to be treated unfairly or
neglected." Connery, An Analysis of the HHS Notice On Treating the Handicapped, 63 HosP.
PROG. 18, 20 (July 1982).
112 One doctor criticized the notice as "vague and misdirected" and an undesirable at-
tempt to legislate morality. Fost, Putting Hospitals on Notice, 12 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 5, 8
(1982).
113 One hospital administrator referred to the notice as "a non-binding opinion." Hospital
Warned About Loss of Funds in Withholding Treatment, Associated Press (May 19, 1982) (available
on NEXIS library).
114 Office of the Secretary, Department of Health and Human Services, Nondiscrimination
on the Basis of Handicap, 48 FED. REG. 9630 (1983) (interim final rule modifying 45 C.F.R.
§ 84.61).
115 See note 108 supra and accompanying text.
116 48 Fed. Reg. 9630 (1983).
117 The notice read in its entirety:
DISCRIMINATORY FAILURE TO FEED AND CARE FOR HANDICAPPED
INFANTS IN THIS FACILITY IS PROHIBITED BY FEDERAL LAW.
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 states that no otherwise qualified
handicapped individual shall, solely by reason of handicap, be excluded from par-
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son having knowledge that a handicapped infant is being discrimina-
torily denied food or customary medical care."
1'1 8
The medical profession immediately criticized the rule."t9 On
March 18, 1983, the American Academy of Pediatrics, the National
Association of Children's Hospitals and Related Institutions, and
Children's Hospital National Medical Center, filed suit against the
HHS Secretary, asking the court to declare the interim final rule in-
valid and enjoin its enforcement.
120
On April 14, 1983, a District of Columbia federal district court
declared that the interim final rule was "arbitrary and capricious
and promulgated in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act
(A.P.A.)."' 2' The court ordered the Secretary to declare the rule in-
valid.122 The court concluded that HHS had promulgated the rule
without notice or opportunity for comment by persons affected by it,
ticipation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
program or activity receiving federal financial assistance.
Any person having knowledge that a handicapped infant is being discriminatoil denied
food or customay medical care should immedialey contact:
Handicapped Infant Hotline
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
Washington, D.C. 20201
Phone 800 - -
(Available 24 hours a day)
or
Your State Child Protection Agency
Federal law prohibits retaliation or intimidation against any person who pro-
vides information about possible violations of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.
Identity of callers will be held confidential.
Failure to feed and care for infants may also violate the criminal and civil laws
of your State.
Id 9630-31 (1983).
118 Id at 9031.
119 See Physicians Criticize Rules on Newborns, N.Y. Times, April 7, 1983, at C3, col. 1.
120 Complaint at 17-18, American Academy of Pediatrics v. Heckler, No. 83-0774 (D.D.C.
filed Mar. 18, 1983). The complaint alleged, inter alia, that the rule did not comply with the
30 day notice requirement of the Administrative Procedure Act, see note 123 infra, failed to
establish minimum procedures for appropriate investigation of and/or intervention in medi-
cal decisions concerning defective new infants, failed to provide adequate or even minimal
procedures to protect the confidentiality of medical reports, jeopardized medical care of de-
fective infants, and ignored the findings of the recently released report by the President's
Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral
Research (see note 126 infra). Complaint at 8-17, Heckler.
121 American Academy of Pediatrics v. Heckler, No. 83-0774 at I (D.D.C. Apr. 14, 1983)
(order and declaration). The Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-576 (1977), is
designed to check overzealous administrators who might otherwise exceed their office's au-
thority, and to prevent "arbitrary official encroachment on private rights." United States v.
Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 644 (1950).
122 Heckler, order and declaration at I.
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as the A.P.A. required.1 23
Although the court invalidated the rule primarily on procedural
grounds, it did discuss the underlying issue-withholding treatment
from defective infants. The court noted that traditionally, the deci-
sion to treat or not to treat a defective newborn had been made
within the privacy of the physician/parent relationship. 24 The court
said these parties usually weighed several factors in making their de-
cisions. For example, the risks of treatment, the infant's quality of
life, the prognosis of a certain death, and the impact a defective in-
fant would have on the family and its financial resources are all fac-
tors parents considered in deciding whether to withhold treatment.1
25
The court found that the rule did not adequately consider these
factors.12
6
123 American Academy of Pediatrics v. Heckler, No. 83-0884 (D.D.C. Apr. 14, 1983)
(memorandum accompanying order). The Act requires, inter alia, that notice, a comment
period, and publication of the rule be given 30 days prior to its effective date. 5 U.S.C.
§ 553(b)-(d) (1977). However, these requirements can be waived if "the agency for good
cause finds ... that notice and public procedure thereon are impractical, unnecessary, or
contrary to the public interest." Id at § 553(b)(B).
124 Heckler, memorandum accompanying order at 1.
125 Id. at 2-3. One commentator criticized the court's suggestion that a decision to with-
hold treatment should be based on the quality of life of others (the infant's family): "[T]his
would be a monumental and unjustified change in the law, and runs contrary to child abuse
and neglect statutes." Annas, Disconnecting the Baby Doe Hot/ine, 13 HASTINGS CENTER REP.
14, 15-16 (June 1983).
126 The court found the Secretary had also not considered "many highly relevant factors
central to. . .medical care of newborn infants" before promulgating the rule. Heckler, mem-
orandum accompanying order at 10. Among these factors were the disruptive effect a 24-
hour hotline for reporting non-treatment might have on ongoing treatment, parental and
family interests involved in such decisions, and funding and medical resource allocation
problems. Id at 10-12. The court found that the various legal and constitutional interests
involved had not been adequately considered, and that a "customary medical care" standard
for handicapped infants had not been established. Id at 12-13. The court also found it dis-
turbing that the Secretary failed to consider the eminent release of the report of the Presi-
dent's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and
Behavioral Research ("President's Commission"), which suggested different approaches to
the issue. Id at 12. See also notes 149-153 infra and accompanying text.
The President's Commission convened in January 1980 with a congressional mandate to
report on "the matter of defining death" and "any other appropriate matter." 42 U.S.C.
§ 300v-1(a) (Supp. 1981). The Commission consisted of eleven prominent members of the
medical, legal, clerical, and related professions. On March 21, 1983, the Commission pub-
lished their report on decisions to withhold treatment. In this report, the Commission criti-
cized the HHS notice and interim rule as inneffective and "adding further uncertainty to an
already complex situation." The President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems
in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research, Deciding to Forego Life Sustaining Treat-
ment. A Report on Ethical, Afedical and Legal Issues in Treatment Decisions 226-227 (Comm. Print
March 21, 1983). The Commission recommended that the government encourage hospitals
to improve their in-house supervision of such decisions and not become directly involved in
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The HHS Secretary had argued that the A.P.A.'s thirty-day no-
tice requirement should be waived because the rule was necessary to
immediately "protect life from imminent harm."'127 The court found
this argument without merit, 28 and stated that Section 504 had
probably not been intended to "reach so far into such a sensitive area
of moral and ethical concerns .... ,,129 Finally, the court noted that
the rule's application might infringe on parental privacy rights in
some instances. However, the court did not directly address the pri-
vacy issue since it was not squarely presented in the case.
1 30
Two months after the Heckler decision, on July 5, 1983, the HHS
Secretary published a new "proposed rule" on the care of handi-
capped infants 13' which essentially repromulgated the preliminary
rule. In the proposed rule, the Secretary once again emphasized that
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 prohibits denying med-
ical treatment from defective infants on the basis of his handicap.
32
The Secretary explained, however, that "medical decisions" by par-
ents and doctors to withhold treatment were outside Section 504's
scope.133  Rather, Section 504 only applied when "non-medical"
quality of life considerations, such as a handicap, persuaded parents
and doctors to withhold treatment.
134
The proposed rule would also require hospitals to post in infant
care areas a notice practically identical to that which the previous
them. Id at 227. The report also criticized the financial sanction approach of the HHS
actions as having the potential to "unjustly penalize other patients and professionals." Id
127 Heckler, memorandum accompanying order at 13-14.
128 Id at 14 (citing Guardian Fed. Sav. and Loan Ass'n. v. FSLIC, 589 F.2d 658, 664
(D.C. Cir. 1978)). The court said the Secretary had failed to meet the good cause exception
to the A.P.A. notice requirement, see note 123 supra, since the exception should be narrowly
construed. Further, arguing that the rule was necessary to save lives "could as easily be used
to justify immediate implementation of any sort of health or safety regulation . Id at
14-15 (citing New Jersey v. EPA, 626 F.2d 1038, 1045 (D.C. Cir. 1980)).
129 Id at 17. The court said that after extensive research, it found: "[N]o congressional
committee or member of the House or Senate ever even suggested that Section 504 would be
used to monitor medical treatment of defective newborn infants or establish standards for
preserving a particular quality of life." Id at 15.
130 Id at 19.
131 Office of the Secretary, Department of Health and Human Services, Nondiscrimination
on the Basis of Handicap Relation to Health Carefor Handicapped Infants, 48 FED. REG. 30846 (July
5, 1983) (proposed rule modifying 45 C.F.R. § 84.61) [hereinafter cited as Proposed Rule].
132 Id at 30846. The Secretary did not address the Heckler court's finding that no legisla-
tive history indicated § 504 should apply to treatment of defective newborn infants. See note
129 in/a.
133 Id at 30847. The Secretary said "Section 504 does not compel medical personnel to
attempt to perform impossible or futile acts or therapies. . . which merely temporarily pro-
long the process of dying. ... .Id at 30846.
134 Id
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preliminary rule required. t35 Additionally, the proposed rule man-
dates that state child protection agencies receiving federal funds es-
tablish procedures to ensure that the full authority of state law is
used "to prevent medical neglect of handicapped infants."' 36 In ob-
servance of the A.P.A. notice and comment requirement, t37 the pro-
posed rule also allowed a two month comment period, 38 and would
not become effective until after HHS personnel evaluated comments
received during this period. 39
In retrospect, the preliminary rule's "hotline" strategy, which
the proposed rule would continue, proved ineffective. Of 600 calls
received on the hotline from March 17th to April 14th, 1983, only
five warranted further action. 40 But more significantly, administra-
tive action on the issue of withholding treatment from defective in-
fants by HHS is manifestly inappropriate. Regardless of any moral
position on the issue, regulating a problem with such enormous
moral and ethical implications should not be attempted without
thoroughly discussing and considering all factors involved. This pro-
cess should be left to the legislature, not to administrative action.
Only a legislative setting can provide the appropriate forum for dis-
cussion that the issue of withholding treatment from defective infants
requires.
135 See note 117 supra.
136 Proposed Rule, supra note 131, at 30851. The proposed rule says these procedures shall
include:
(1) A requirement that health care providers report immediately to the State
agency suspected cases of medical neglect of handicapped infants; (2) A method
by which the agency can receive reports of suspected medical neglect of handi-
capped infants from health care providers, other individuals, and the Department
on a timely basis; (3) Immediate review of reports of suspected medical neglect of
handicapped infants and, where appropriate, onsite investigation of such reports;
(4) Provision of child protective services to medically neglected handicapped in-
fants, including, where appropriate, seeking a timely court order to compel the pro-
vision of necessary nourishment and medical treatment; and (5) Immediate
notification to the Department's Office for Civil Rights of each report of suspected
medical neglect of a handicapped infant, the steps taken by the agency to investi-
gate such report, and the agency's final disposition of such report.
Id at 30851.
137 See note 123 svpra.
138 Proposed Rule, supra note 131, at 30846. When the September 6, 1983, deadline for
comments had arrived, HHS had received over 16,000 comments on the proposed rule. Tele-
phone conversation with S. Shalhoub, Office of Civil Rights, Department of Health and
Human Services (Sept. 29, 1983).
139 HHS personnel estimated the rule would not become effective until December 1983 or
January 1984. Id Court challenges could further delay the effective date.





Since 1973 when the debate on the treatment of defective in-
fants began, prominent figures in the legal, medical, and related pro-
fessions have proposed several different approaches to legislative
treatment. The medical profession itself does not agree that one ap-
proach is best. The majority believes that parent-physician auton-
omy should be left intact, 141 and that ideological criticism and
threats of criminal prosecution make the decision to withhold treat-
ment much more difficult. 42 These doctors reason that since families
and their physicians are intimately aware of all the factors involved,
and since families bear the burden of living with their decision, they
should be allowed to decide whether or not to withhold treatment.143
The majority of doctors therefore believe that parents and physicians
should be allowed great latitude in making decisions affecting defec-
tive infants-as long as they remain within certain general
guidelines.144
A minority of doctors believe, however, that the parent-physi-
cian autonomy approach is inappropriate because of the circum-
stances under which such decisions are usually made. 145 They argue
that parents, emotionally shocked by their defective child and coun-
seled by unfamiliar professionals in an unfamiliar hospital environ-
ment, are in no position to make a life or death decision for their
child. 146 The United States Surgeon General, Doctor C. Everett
Koop, rejects every argument for withholding treatment, calling this
practice "infanticide.' 47 Koop believes that continued reliance on
141 See, e.g., Campbell & Duff, Special Care Nursery, supra note 7, at 893; Garland, Care of the
Newborn: The Decision Not to Treat, 1 PERINATOLOGY/NEONATOLOGY 14, 15 (Sept.-Oct. 1977);
Garland, Jonsen, Phibbs & Tooley, Critical Issues in Newborn Intensive Care: A Conference Report
and Poli Proposal, 55 PEDIAT. 756, 761, 763-64 (1974); Havard, Legislation is Likely to Create
More Diftculties than it Resolves, 9 J. MED. ETHICS 18, 20 (1983); Krane, Howell, Shannon &
Todres, Pediatcian's Attitudes Affecting Decision Making in Defective Newborns, 60 PEDIAT. 197,
199 (1977).
142 Campbell & Duff, Seven Years, supra note 7, at 28.
143 Campbell & Duff, Special Care Nursery, supra note 7, at 893-94.
144 Id
145 See, e.g., Fost, Counseling Families Who Have a Child with a Severe Congenital Anomaly, 67
PEDIAT. 321, 322-23 (1981); Diamond, Treatment Versus Non-Treatment for the Handicapped New-
born, in INFANTICIDE AND THE HANDICAPPED NEWBORN 55, 62 (D. Horan & N. Delahoyd
eds. 1982); Sherlock, Selective Non-Treatment of Newborns, 5 J. MED. ETHICS 139, 139 (1979);
Waldman, Medical Ethics and the Hopelessly Ill Child, 88 J. PEDIAT. 890, 890-91 (1976); Edito-
rial, Severely Handicapped Infants, 7 J. MED. ETHICS 115, 116 (1981).
146 Diamond, supra note 145, at 62-63.
147 Koop, Ethical and Surgical Considerations in the Care of the Newborn with Congenital Abnormal-
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parental-physician autonomy in the treatment decision is
intolerable. 148
In its recent report, Deciding to Forego Life-Sustaining Treatment, the
President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in
Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research ("President's
Commission") criticized governmental intrusion into the parent-phy-
sician decision process and endorsed an informal approach. 149 The
Commission recommended that hospitals be required to institute a
review process for cases when parents and attending physicians de-
cide to withhold treatment from a defective infant. The Commission
suggested that this process include an ethics committee review of the
most difficult cases. 150 The Commission stated that such a process
would guarantee an objective discussion of the relevant issues while
avoiding the public exposure that a court proceeding involves.' 5 '
The Commission also recommended that courts should involve them-
selves only when the "rapidly deteriorating medical status" of a de-
fective infant required parents and physicians to act without the
review.1 52 Courts would then conduct a "retrospective review .. .
[to] ensure a high standard of decision making practices ....
Most legal commentators agree with the minority of doctors
that the decision of whether or not to treat a defective infant should
not be left to parents and physicians. 54 However, legal commenta-
tors have suggested approaches for formulating decision-making
mechanisms different from those suggested by the medical profession.
Professor John G. Robertson 155 suggested that a decision-making
ities, in INFANTICIDE AND THE HANDICAPPED NEWBORN 89 (D. Horan & N. Delahoyd eds.
1982).
148 Id at 103. Interestingly, in an article written by the parents of a defective infant, the
parents also argued that, because of the problems inherent in the situation, parents and hospi-
tals should not be left without guidance in deciding whether or not to treat. Bridge & Bridge,
supra note 8, at 19 ("Since the pediatric profession does not approach these infants with any
degree of consistency, and has its own conflicts of interest, we regard any decision making by
concerned physician and parents behind closed doors of the pediatric unit as a haphazard
approach."). See also Stinson & Stinson, supra note 27, at 8-10.
149 President's Commission, supra note 126, at 227.
150 Id The report stated these reviews would include those cases in which life-sustaining
therapy has been withheld because of a physical or mental handicap. Id
151 Id.
152 Id at 228.
153 Id at 228 n.99.
154 See, e.g., Robertson, supra note 6, at 414 ("By any standard, this is not the optimum
time for parents to make life and death decisions with respect to this newborn.").
155 Professor Robertson, who has written extensively on the issue of withholding treat-
ment from defective infants, teaches in the law school and in the Program in Medical Ethics
at the University of Wisconsin.
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body operating under legislative guidelines should decide whether
treatment should be withheld. He felt such guidelines would repre-
sent a collective social judgment rather than the "idiosyncratic
choices of parents or committees." 156 Professor Robertson admitted
that articulating acceptable criteria for when treatment should be
withheld would be difficult, but insists that it is nonetheless neces-
sary. 157 He also recommended that, to ensure consistency, parents
should follow mandatory procedures after a defective infant's
birth. 58 These steps would include instituting a mandatory seven
day waiting period during which no treatment could be withheld,
providing counseling sessions for the parents with social workers, and
providing parents with access to all information on agencies avail-
able to assist them should their child live.159 .
Another legal commentator suggested judicial review of paren-
tal decisions, but only if that decision is to withhold treatment. 160
This judicial review would be limited to consideration of only two
issues: the infeasibility of treatment' 6' and the decision-making
process. 1
62
Several commentators ,have stated that courts, acting under leg-
islative guidance, are the appropriate decision-making bodies. 163
One author, T.S. Ellis, III, suggested the novel approach of creating
a decisional matrix to guide courts' decisions.164 Within this matrix,
the court would consider the infant's particular defective condition,
the treatment necessary to correct that condition, current medical
capabilities, and the economic, psychological, and moral impact on
the family and society. 165 Ellis concluded that legislative guidance
156 Robertson, supra note 6, at 266.
157 Id at 267. He compared the problem of drafting criteria for withholding treatment
with the problem of drafting the definition of brain death. Id at 269. Robertson's view is
realistic. The task of articulating such criteria should not be avoided because of its difficulty.
158 Id at 267.
159 The Arizona legislature included informational requirements similar to those Robert-
son suggested in their legislation concerning withholding treatment from defective infants.
See note 182 infra and accompanying text.
160 Note, Birth Defective Infants.: A Standardfor Non-Treatment Decisions, 30 STAN. L. REV. 599,
629-31 (1975).
161 Treatment is infeasible, according to the commentator, in situations of imminent
death and irreversible unconsciousness. Id at 631.
162 The proper decisional process, according to the commentator, is: 1) a prognosis of
infeasibility by the physician; 2) parental understanding of all options; and, 3) a final paren-
tal decision to withhold treatment. Id at 628, 632.
163 See, e.g., Ellis, supra note 6, at 415-18; Longino, supra note 6, at 403-05 ("Courts and the
judicial process might serve as a more appropriate decision making forum.").
164 Ellis, supra note 6, at 418-2 1.
165 Id.
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was imperative: "It is simply society's duty, through the legislative




Despite the medical community's suggestion that the decision to
withhold treatment be left to parents and physicians, several state
legislatures have passed legislation that restricts parent-physician au-
tonomy. These statutes all have positive aspects, but unfortunately,
most do not provide the guidance needed in those exceptional situa-
tions where life-sustaining treatment, by all ethical standards, should
be withheld from a defective infant.
The Pennsylvania legislature integrated legislation on withhold-
ing treatment from defective infants with their abortion regulation
laws.' 67 The statute classifies all human beings born alive as "per-
sons" under the Pennsylvania Constitution. 68 Some commentators
have suggested criteria for "personhood" that would exclude defec-
tive infants, thereby denying them constitutional protection. 69 The
Pennsylvania statute, however, safeguards severely defective new-
born infants' constitutional protections by clearly including them in
its definition of "person."
The statute further provides:
All physicians . . .attending a child who is born alive . . .
shall provide such child that type and degree of care and treatment
which, in the good faith judgment of the physician, is commonly
and customarily provided to any other person under similar condi-
tions and circumstances. 70
The phrase "commonly and customarily provided to any other per-
son under similar conditions and circumstances" in this statute is am-
biguous. In the case of a child born with spina bifida with
myelomeningocele, as in Matter of Cicero ,'17 1 a "person under similar
conditions and circumstances" would be another infant born with
these defects. The treatment of such infants is currently a topic of
166 Id at 423.
167 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 3212 (Purdon Supp. 1974-1982).
168 Id § 3212(a).
169 See, e.g., Fletcher, Four Indicators of Humanhood-The Inquig, Matures, 4 HASTINGS
CENTER REP. 4, 5-6 (Dec. 1974). Fletcher suggested four criteria for personhood: neocortical
function, self-consciousness, relational ability, and happiness. Id.
170 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 3212(b) (Purdon Supp. 1974-1982).
171 See notes 39-47 supra and acompanying text.
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debate in the medical profession; 72 thus, "commonly and customa-
rily" has no meaning in this instance and its application fails to guide
a court facing the decision. As the Heckler court noted, "there is no
customary standard of care for the treatment of severely defective
infants."t73
The Pennsylvania statute has several other deficiencies. The
statute does not grant immunity to physicians for treating a newborn
without parental consent. Such immunity is necessary io insulate a
doctor from civil liability for treating a critically ill defective infant if
the parents refuse consent for the treatment. The statute also estab-
lishes no reporting requirements. Because decisions to withhold
treatment were seldom reported in the past, such reporting require-
ments are essential to make such legislation effective. The Penn-
sylvania statute also has no provisions to assist the parents of a
defective infant. Such provisions should: (1) require that informa-
tion be provided to the parents of a defective newborn on the various
public agencies that are available to assist them; and (2) establish a
mechanism for parents who do not wish to care for their infant to
relinquish custody of the child.
The Arizona legislature recently enacted legislation concerning
withholding treatment from defective newborn infants which does
not have many of the deficiencies of the Pennsylvania statute.174 The
Arizona statute forbids the denial of food, water, nutrients, or oxygen
from newborn infants. 175 Such a clause is necessary to prevent cases
such as Mueller176 and Infant Doe'17 7 from recurring. The suggestion
by some doctors that active euthanasia be employed to hasten the
death of defective infants 78 provides further justification for the
clause. The statute also forbids the denial of "necessary life-saving
172 See, e.g., Lorber, note 7 supra; Zachary, Give Every Baby a Chance, 147 NURSING MIR-
ROR 17 (1978).
173 Heckler, memorandum accompanying order at 13.
174 Act of Apr. 27, 1983, 1983 Ariz. Legis. Serv. 1112 (West)(to be codified at A.R.S.
§§ 13-3620 and 36-2281) (effective July 1, 1984)[hereinafter cited as Act].
175 Id § 36-2281(A).
176 See notes 48-58 supra and accompanying text.
177 See notes 69-90supra and accompanying text.
178 See, e.g., Freeman, Is There a Right to Die- Quickly? 80 J. PEDIAT. 904, 905 (1972) ("[I]n
those rare instances where the decision has been made to avoid 'heroic' measures and to allow
'nature to take its course,' should society not allow physicians to alleviate the pain and suffer-
ing and help nature to take it's course- quickly?"); Reid, Spina Bfida: The Fate ofthe Un-
treated, 7 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 16, 19 (Aug. 1977)("It is not a valid argument that man
has managed without euthanasia for most of his civilised existence and therefore should con-
tinue to manage without it. . . . When ethical values become no longer acceptable, they
must be replaced.'.
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medical treatment or surgical care" from newborns.1 79 Thus, this
statute would effectively prevent the Infant Doe situation, where par-
ents and their physician denied an infant the surgery necessary to
correct a tracheo-esophageal fistula.
Unlike the Pennsylvania statute, the Arizona statute contains
several enforcement provisions. The statute establishes reporting re-
quirements for health care personnel and provides absolute immu-
nity from civil or criminal liability to those making these reports.'180
It also requires health care institutions to inform their personnel of
these reporting requirements. 81
The Arizona statute also has an informational requirement.
Health care institutions must provide parents of handicapped
newborns with information concerning agencies available to assist
them.18 2 This requirement ensures that parents of a defective infant
can make an informed decision about their newborn, knowing what
assistance they can expect from these agencies.
The Arizona statute's weakness is that it allows parents and
their physician, while exercising competent medical judgment, to
withhold treatment not necessary to sustain life, or treatment where
the "potential risk to the child's life or health outweighs the potential
benefits."' 18 3 This language presents two problems. First, the terms
"potential risk"and "potential benefit" are ambiguous. The statute
does not define them and they are therefore subject to broad inter-
pretation. Applying this statute to the Mueller situation, 18 4 the par-
ents would have been able to prevent the surgery that separated the
twins since a great risk is involved in such surgery, and the operation
was not necessary to save the twins' lives. Second, the statute allows
parents and physicians to make the decision to withhold treatment
under these circumstances without review. But, continued parent-
physician autonomy is inherently unfair to the infants involved. Be-
cause of the emotional, confused, and vulnerable state parents are in
following the birth of a defective infant, they are very dependent
upon their physician's advice. However, given the current diversity
in medical opinion on this issue, the advice of these physicians can
179 Act, supra note 174, § 36-2281(B).
180 Id § 13-3620(A). The statute also provides immunity from civil liability and discipli-
nary action for these reports. Id. §§ 13-3620(D), 36-2282(B).
181 Id § 36-2282(A).
182 Id § 36-2283.
183 Id § 36-2281(C).
184 See notes 48-58 supra and accompanying text.
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vary immensely.1 85 Thus, whether an infant receives life-saving
treatment and survives, or is denied this treatment and "allowed" to
die, depends primarily on the fortuity of the attending physician's
personal views. Unfortunately, the Arizona statute allows this situa-
tion to continue within guidelines so ambiguous that they provide no
guidance at all.
The Louisiana statute on withholding treatment from defective
infants 8 6 is similar to the Arizona statute. It provides that:
No infant born alive shall be denied food, nutrients, water, oxygen
• . . [or] medical or surgical care necessary to attempt to save the
life of the child . . . despite the opinion of the . . . parents . . .
physicians, or others that the quality of the child's life would be
deficient .... 187
Also like the Arizona statute, the Louisiana statute establishes several
reporting requirements. 188
The Louisiana statute, however, includes several useful provi-
sions not included in the Arizona legislation. The statute allows "any
agency, institution, or person interested in the child's welfare" to in-
stitute enforcement proceedings in juvenile court and provides that
the court shall appoint an attorney to represent the infant.'8 9 This
provision strengthens the statute's enforcement provisions by grant-
ing anyone standing to protect an infant's well-being. The Louisiana
statute also allows doctors to proceed with treatment of a defective
infant when parents refuse to consent to such treatment. 90 The stat-
ute also provides that parents of a defective infant may at any time
surrender the child to an adoption agency, at which time the agency
will immediately provide the infant with necessary treatment.' 9'
This provision allows parents who do not want the responsibility of
raising their defective infant an alternative other than ordering their
185 This problem has even been pointed out in medical literature. See, e.g., Waldman,
supra note 129, at 891 ("1 find the ethics and morality of the neonatal intensive care unit a
total enigma. In some places the neonatal intensive care unit is committed to the role of
salvaging every infant. . . . And in. . . other intensive care units, neonatologists admit that
they allowed infants to die. . . by administratively witholding treatment .... "); Editorial,
The Right to Live andthe Right to Die, 283 BRIT. MED. J. 569, 569 (1982)("[G]uidance given to
parents varies among doctors-it is likely to be pragmatic and personal .
186 LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 1299.36.1-36.3 (West Supp. 1983).
187 Id § 1299.36.1(A)-.l(B).
188 Id § 1299.36.2(B).
189 Id § 1299.36.3(A).
190 Id § 1299.36.2(C).
191 Id § 1299.36.2(A).
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doctor to withhold treatment. 92
The Louisiana statute allows parents and physicians, exercising
competent medical judgment, to withhold treatment from a defec-
tive infant in two situations: (1) when the potential risks to the
child's life or health outweigh the potential benefits of survival, and
(2) when a child is in a "continual profound comatose state" with
"no reasonable chance of recovery. . . . '93 The first clause suffers
from the same vagueness problem as the Arizona statute. The second
clause, however, is a more effective attempt to provide guidance for
when treatment may be withheld. However, a legislative commis-
sion 194 should further define what constitutes a "continual profound
comatose state" to prevent misinterpretation of the clause. Unfortu-
nately, even though the Louisiana statute's guidance may be some-
what better than the Arizona statute's, it still leaves the decision of
when to withhold treatment from a defective infant to the parents
and their physician. Any future legislation should instead allow only
courts to make this decision.
C. Recommended Legislation
The Pennsylvania, Arizona, and Louisiana statutes have a basi-
cally similar approach to the problem of withholding treatment from
defective infants. These statutes presume that all defective infants
should be treated, and allow treatment to be withheld from these
infants only in exceptional circumstances. This approach is consistent
with both the value our society places on human life and with four-
teenth amendment guarantees. Each statute has its strengths and
weaknesses. Combining the best aspects of each statute would result
(with the addition of item eight) in a statute containing the
following:
(1) A statement defining "persons" to include any infant born
alive, regardless of his condition at birth;
(2) A clause which absolutely forbids withholding food, nour-
ishment, water, or oxygen from a newborn infant;
(3) A clause which forbids withholding medical or surgical
care when such care is necessary to save the infant's life;
(4) A section which requires medical personnel to report all
cases where treatment is withheld from a defective infant. This sec-
192 Id It also gives the infant an opportunity for a home with adoptive parents who care
for it rather than biological parents who do not want the infant.
193 Id §§ 1299.36.2C, 1299.36.2D.
194 Such a commission should be composed of physicians, lawyers, clergy, and other quali-
fied professionals.
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tion should also require health care institutions to inform their em-
ployees of these requirements and to instruct them in how to make
such reports;
(5) A method whereby the parents of a defective infant can
quickly and voluntarily surrender custody of their child for treat-
ment and eventual adoption, should they so desire;
(6) A requirement that health care institutions provide the in-
fant's parents with information on agencies which are available to
assist and counsel them should they desire to proceed with treat-
ment and retain custody of the child;
(7) Civil and criminal immunity for medical personnel who
comply with the statutory reporting requirement and for doctors
who proceed with treatment without parental consent; and,
(8) A clause permitting a court to order treatment to be with-
held from a defective infant under specifically defined
circumstances.
Even the most outspoken advocates of treatment for defective
infants admit situations exist where treatment would be futile. 195
Rather than allowing unquestioned parent-physician discretion in
these cases, item eight requires that decisions to withhold treatment
be made by courts acting within legislative guidelines. In the past,
courts acting without legislative guidance have acted inconsistently.
The court in Infant Doe 196 permitted parents to withhold food from a
Down's syndrome infant who had a relatively minor physical defect,
while the court in Matter of Cicero 1 97 ordered treatment of an infant
with a more serious physical defect. Item eight would allow courts to
order treatment withheld from a defective infant under "specifically
defined circumstances." However, these circumstances must be
painstakingly defined by a legislative committee after thorough de-
195 For example, Dr. Koop has stated:
[Mledicine may never have all the solutions to all the problems that occur at birth. I
personally foresee no medical solution to cephalodymus or an anencephalic child.
The first is a one-headed twin; the second, a child with virtually no functioning
brain at all. In these cases the prognosis is an early and merciful death by natural
causes. There are no so-called "heroic measures" possible and intervention would
merely prolong the patient's process of dying.
Some of nature's errors are extraordinary and frightening. . . but nature also
has the kindness to take them away. For such infants, neither medicine nor law can
be of any help. And neither medicine nor law should prolong these infants' process
of dying.
Handicapped Infants: Over-sight Hearing on the Treatment of Handicapped Infants Born with Other
Defects Before the Subcomm. on Select Education of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1982) (statement of Dr. C. Everett Koop, U.S. Surgeon General, Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services).
196 See notes 69-90 supra and accompanying text.
197 See notes 39-47 supra and accompanying text.
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liberation. This committee, consisting of physicians, lawyers, and
other qualified lay persons, could thus provide the concrete guidance
courts need for consistent decisions. Even though requiring a court
order to withhold treatment might be awkward, such a requirement
accords with the presumption of treatment for all defective infants
and provides a degree of consistency and fairness which these deci-
sions require. Additionally, courts and legislatures could develop
procedures to expedite judicial action and minimize the delay in ob-
taining an order.
Legislation to preserve the lives of all but the most defective in-
fants carries with it the responsibility to provide assistance to the in-
fants and their families. Legislatures must not overlook this
responsibility, and must provide funds to support medical payment
assistance, counseling, and special training and educational
programs. 198
IV. Conclusion
Those confronted with the decision of whether or not to treat a
defective infant face an enormous ethical and moral dilemma. The
many inconsistencies associated with past decisions illustrate the ne-
cessity for a legislative solution. To permit parents and physicians to
make these decisions on an ad hoc basis is unfair to the infants in-
volved. The distraught parents of a defective newborn infant are un-
duly influenced by the attending physician's advice and that advice
can vary greatly from one physician to another. Whether a defective
infant lives or dies should not depend upon the fortuity of the deliv-
ering physician's personal views.
Only courts, guided by legislation, can ensure that fair and con-
sistent decisions are reached. Requiring a court order to withhold
treatment from a defective infant may be cumbersome, but proce-
dures to facilitate rapid judicial response could be developed. Our
society provides an elaborate review mechanism to criminals sen-
tenced to death. Society certainly owes innocent defective infants
similar safeguards when the decision to withhold treatment from
them is just as final as a death sentence.
John M. Macejczyk
198 Accord, President's Commission, supra note 110, at 228-29. The commission stated that
the decision to provide life-sustaining treatment to newborns creates an obligation to provide
the "continuing care that makes a reasonable range of life choices possible." Id
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